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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

12 Plaintiff,

13 v.

14 SAUL ONTIVEROS SOLIS,
EDUARDO GARCIA

15 Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00016-DAD-BAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE
TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
AND ORDER

DATE: September 28, 2020

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

17 This case is set for a status conference on September 28, 2020. As set forth below, the parties
18 now move, by stipulation, to continue the status conference to December 14, 2020, and to exclude the
19 time period between September 28, 2020 and December 14, 2020 under the Speedy Trial Act.
20

On April 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 617, which suspends all jury trials in the
Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to
continue all criminal matters to a date after June 1. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order
618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California until further notice. These and
previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive
openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case.
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.* at 509; see also *United States v. Ramirez-Cortez*, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

5 Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory
6 and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice
7 continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that
8 the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
9 defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless
10 “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the
11 ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and
12 the defendant in a speedy trial.” *Id.*

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).¹ If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

¹ The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make “additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2020).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through defendants' counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status hearing on September 28, 2020.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until
ber 14, 2020, and to exclude time between September 28, 2020, and December 14, 2020, under
Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
 - a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, photographs, video recordings, audio records, and other investigative documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
 - b) As a result of the public health emergency, defense counsel have limited access to their clients. Defense counsel require additional time to convey discovery to their clients, and to consult with and review discovery and other case matters with their clients. Defense counsel require additional time to review discovery with their clients, conduct investigation, and to discuss potential resolution with counsel for the government.
 - c) The government does not object to the continuance.
 - d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
 - e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 28, 2020 to December 14, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the

1 Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial
2 must commence.

3 IT IS SO STIPULATED.

4
5 Dated: September 16, 2020

MC GREGOR W. SCOTT
United States Attorney

6
7 /s/ KATHERINE E. SCHUH _____
KATHERINE E. SCHUH
8 Assistant United States Attorney

9
10 Dated: September 16, 2020

/s/ VIRNA SANTOS _____
VIRNA SANTOS
11 Counsel for Defendant
Saul Ontiveros Solis

12
13 Dated: September 16, 2020

/s/ KEVIN P. ROONEY _____
KEVIN P. ROONEY
14 Counsel for Defendant
Eduardo Garcia

16 **ORDER**
17

18 IT IS SO ORDERED that the Status Conference is continued from September 28, 2020 to
19 **December 14, 2020, at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe.** Time is excluded
20 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).

21 IT IS SO ORDERED.

22 Dated: September 16, 2020

/s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe

23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE